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Glossary 
cash Bow Cash receipts minus cash disbursements. 
economies of scale The reduction in the cost of producing 
goods and services because of increasing size of the 
producing organization. 
effectiveness A measure of the relationship of outputs to 
goals or objectives. 
efficiency A measure of the relationship of inputs to outputs. 
performance Behavior that leads to a measured value 
outcome in the future. It is context specific. 
therbligs A set of actions defined by Frank and Lillian 
Gilbreth for use in time and motion studies. 
This history of performance measurement focuses on 
the development of performance measurement in com-
mercial organizations over the past 500 years. As would be 
expected, performance measurement over the centuries 
has been directed at providing stakeholders with a picture 
of their organization. As the model of business and 
technology shifted, so did the need for the information 
to understand the performance of the organization. 
Models that are viewed as having significant defects 
today, such as return on investment, did provide useful 
information for the organizations for which they were 
designed. There is a continuing challenge to develop 
a measurement system that effectively and efficiently cap-
tures organizational performance in a timely fashion. The 
highlights of the evolution of performance measurement 
covered here exemplify changes to performance measure-
ment that have occurred over the centuries. Other exam-
ples could have been used. The examples chosen, in the 
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authors' view, capture the spirit of the times and the 
evolution of performance measurement. 
Early Measurement Systems 
Luca Pacioli is probably best known for his contributions 
to accounting. The ideas and processes described in his 
Summa de Arithmetica, Geometrica, Proportioni, et 
Proportionalita from 1494 are still applied by many in 
the accounting profession today. However, he can also 
be characterized as a pioneer in the area of performance 
measurement. The Summa also includes discussions of 
the topic of performance measurement as well as internal 
controls, such as numbering and dating ledgers, journals, 
and memorandums. In addition to describing the double-
entry accounting system, Pacioli led businessmen through 
the necessary steps to account for all of their transactions. 
He identifies three things that are required to operate 
a successful business. First, there must be some sort of 
market need or justification for the endeavor. Second, the 
businessman must be a good accountant and mathema-
tician. Third, the affairs of the businessman must be ar-
ranged systematically so that he may understand the 
business at a glance. Fundamentally, this means that 
the businessman must have an orderly record of the per-
formance of the business. For the merchants of the time, 
this meant understanding the gain or loss for any partic-
ular venture. Pacioli described the specific entries re-
quired to recognize a profit or loss. Basic financial 
measures provided a means to evaluate the performance 
of the individual enterprise. 
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From the period of Pacioli into thC' lSth (•Pntury. 
businesses tended to lw family-nm organizations: their 
primary focus in the area of perl(mnance measur('lll<'nt 
centered on the calculation of profit and loss for projeets 
undertaken. The OWlll' rs wen· staking thl'ir assets on spe-
eific endeavors. The fundamental question was wlwtlwr 
the investment (i.e .. running the family business) g:e1wr-
ated sullkient cash flow to continue the ventnrl' . 
As transportation and teehnology improvPd. the fo<·11s 
on the managPment and measurement of performam·p 
t>volved. In the 18th ('<'lltury. Josiah Wedgwood. fact->d 
with thP competition in the pottery industry. rpafized 
that thP old methods of manufacturing and employet' 
management would no longer suffice. He sought alterna-
tivP approaches to mana¢ng his operations. Wed~voo<L 
through his systematization of production. division of 
lahor. and disciplining of labor. is one of the pirnwers 
of English factory organization. Wedgwood appointed 
foremen and managers and established what would 
now be defined as workgroups. or individual workers spe-
dalizing in t>ach area of manufacturing. from making the 
pottery through painting. As the organization continued 
to grow. Wed~vood created the Potter.; ' lnstmclim1 of 
1780 to define mies and rl•gulations for manufacturing 
along with guidanct' for the fort>man regarding rewarding 
Pmployees and reprimanding employees who were not 
performing aecording to expected standards. Addition-
;Jly. Wedgwood paid piece rates and had bonus schemes 
to stimulate productivity. His innovations provided a h<L'iis 
for measuring performance at the operational level. 
About 40 years afi:n Potter's Instructio11 was printt>d. 
one of the first uses of tlw tPrm ··accountability"' appeared 
in a report published for the Springfield Ammry. The 
1819 report addressed innovations in two spe<:ific arem;: 
( l) processes used for manufacturing and inspecting pro-
duction work and (2) the use ofdoubk•-entry bookkeeping 
for every transaction by tlw employee. related to the man-
ufacturing of items within the armory. The specifie trans-
aetions recorded information about the physical amounts 
and value of material used as well <L'i the amount and value 
of scrap and good inventory n•ceived at th<' end of tlw 
workday. In 1834. the Ordnance Department of tlw 
Springfield Armory published its own official doe1111wnt. 
Onfoa11cl' Ref!,ulatiorrs. Inclnded in this publication were 
two objectives related to accountability and managenw11t 
stmcture: ( 1) the carefitl delineation of lint's of authority 
and communication (2) setting: standards of uniformity for 
aeeounting and manufaeturing praeticPs. Danit•l Taylor. 
a West Point graduate who wrote the document. intro-
duced into the manufacturing proeess within the Armo~· 
a new standard for performance mt'asurement and disci-
pline. Taylor"s innovations at the Springfield Armory have 
been trnet>d to studies <·oncl11ctt'd at \Vest Point under the 
guidan(·p of S~·lvanns Thayer to t>stahlish a merit s~'StPm 
for st11dt'nt t•valuation . Tavlor. a student at \\'t·st Point 
jrn:t prior to the arrival of Thayrr. was a part of tlw 
tmnsition to •l system of grading students aml holdi11g 
them aecountahle for their performance. It has lwt·11 
pmpost•d that Taylor adapted tlw aeeountability and 
performam·{• measurement ideas from West Point to 
tht• armorv. 
Late 19th-Early 20th Century 
As the Hlth t"entu~· came to a dosl'. the U.S. Congress 
identifit'd a Jlt'Pcl to t' liminat<' thP restraints on trade and 
eompt'tition in the Unitt'd Statt's. To address the iss11<'. 
Congress passed tilt' Sherman Anti-Tmst Aet of 18!-J<I. Th<· 
act was established to protect trade and commerce against 
unlawful trusts and monopolies. The act also influem·<·d 
performance measun•mpnt. As Thurman Arnold noted i11 
The Bottleiwcks 1!{ B11silwss . wlwn the at"t W<L'i first passed. 
many interprPted it to lw an attack on big business. purely 
hast>d on their sizt>. perhaps even prohibiting organiza-
tions from taking advantage of 111<L'iS production or distri-
bution. Howt'vt>r. thne Wt'rt' thost' who saw the ShPrma11 
Anti-Trust Ad not :L<; simply a tool to use against an~· larg<' 
organization . hut rather <L'i a tool to address ahust•s that 
might result from the economit" power of large organiza-
tions. Thurman \V. Arnold. who held the office oftht> lwacl 
of the Anti-Trust J)j,·ision of the U.S. J usticc Department. 
took the position that it W<L'i not size in and of itself that 
nPedt~d to bt• controlled. but ratlwr the ust' of markl't 
power to unrPasonably restrain trade. 
From a production point ofvi<'w. if organizations could 
not use their power to restrain trade. competition was 
mon• likPly to flourish . Given the potential for eompeti-
tion. the leaders of large organizations facP<l the rwed to 
lw more eompetiti\'e. Ont" way to do so was to find mon· 
pffidt'nt ways to prodm:l' their goods and servil"es. 
Eeonomips of scalP lwcame inen' <L'iingly important. 
The measun•rnt•nt of p<'rfonnan<"<' now more than t•n·r 
wm; a nel'essary part of managing a business. The eonti11-
uing alh-am·ps in te('hnology and distribution s~ ·stt'lllS 
helpt'd transform tlw manufacturing environment. 
With tlw changl'S t"anw problPms. Om• W<L'i dt>ter-
mining performam·<> t>xpeetations for incli'<idnal worki·rs. 
Frank B. Copley. in his hook Frt>dl'rick W. Taylor. t>x-
plains how Ta~·lor"s tlwory of sdPntifil" 111anage11w11t rl'-
sulted from his ath•111pts to address the problem of till' 
appropriate amount of work that anv gi\'l'n person ought 
to eomplete rn1 any given day with the right tools and 
matPrials. Ta~·lor had publislwd a hook in 191 I. Sl"il'lltijif' 
Mmwg<'111c11f. in whiC'h he dcsl"rihed his nwthods of gatli-
t•ring and pro\.icling to managt' ment the knowledge that 
hacl traditiouallv ht•en in the domain of the workers. 
The pro('ess h~; which he did this indndt'd rt'l'Or<ling 
and talmlating clata and. when appropriate. iclentil~illg 
the rpfevant rules. laws. and 111atlwrnatical relationships. 
Taylor's work introduced the concept of time 
standards for processes as well as the need for 
a standard set of tasks to be completed. A difficulty in 
using his method of managing the work being performed 
lies in the ability to collect meaningful data. Getting the 
workforce to provide information that was surely going to 
affect their piece-rate system was no easy task. In addition, 
the machinery might not function properly, or could 
break down altogether. Taylor applied common sense 
to decide on which acts to focus to yield the largest return. 
The focus was on the measurement of performance of the 
task or tasks that would most likely have an impact on 
the overall production process, rather than on the mea-
surement of everything. 
The standards developed by Taylor were based on 
a scientific method of gathering data and mathematical 
formulas, and as such provided a control mechanism to 
manage the unit. Taylor saw the need for both financial 
and nonfinancial measures. The blend of information 
from the time studies, as well as the cost data, provided 
a set of information that could be used to measure the 
performance of a given production unit. Taylor's view of 
cost accounting was that it was not useful unless it was 
combined with the accurate measurements of the work 
performed. 
In a book written in 1964, Efficiency and Uplift , Samuel 
Haber discussed the establishment in 1911 of the Taylor 
Society; this group ofTaylorites, an informal but exclusive 
group of individuals, included Frank Gilbreth and Henry 
Gantt. Both men would soon be cast out of the Taylor 
Society for their additions and revisions to the "scientific 
management" way of thinking. Haber describes how 
Gilbreth concentrated his efforts on the "scientific" aspect 
of Taylor's work. In 1912, Gilbreth introduced the 
motion-picture camera as a means of obtaining more 
exact measurements of work performed by an employee 
in the manufacturing process. Taylor refuted the process 
by claiming that it was only an aspect of scientific man-
agement, undoubtedly good for investigating the minutiae 
of motion. Early on, Taylor approved of the experiments, 
but later he became concerned that the concentration on 
motion studies was part of a more grandiose scheme and 
that Gilbreth's focus neglected the broader scope of sci-
entific management. 
Gantt's attempt to introduce revisions to the scientific 
management approach included introducing a focus on 
social reform and attempting to get at inefficiency in work 
methods by looking at management, not just the workers. 
Taylor found these ideas to be unacceptable. Taylor's 
approach to the work in the factory centered on the prob-
lem of setting the tasks of the worker. Gantt, on the other 
hand, argued that the place to attack inefficiencies was not 
with the laborer, but with management. Most of Gantt's 
innovations in the area of management came from his 
search to set performance standards for management 
-
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similar to those set for the workers-using a stopwatch. 
Idleness of man or machine was an indication of manage-
ment malfeasance. In Gantt's system, costs associated 
with idleness were not added to product. They were de-
ducted directly from profits. This approach was designed 
to have a direct effect on those individuals in a manage-
ment role and to focus performance measurement at 
a higher level of the organization. 
During the same period of time that Taylor was devel-
oping his work in scientific management, and continu-
ing after Taylor's death in 1915, Alexander Hamilton 
Church wrote articles with a focus on areas that included 
accounting, management, and performance measure-
ment. Richard Vangermeerch, in his authoritative book, 
Alexander Hamilton Church (1988), describes how the 
foundation of Church's writings centered on the increas-
ing complexity found in the manufacturing environments, 
focusing on the control of the operation. In the first work 
that Church published, he concentrated on the increased 
competition and the necessity for coordination and quick 
presentation of results. For control to be a reality for 
Church, inputs and financial results needed to be both 
forecasted and compared after the fact. Church recog-
nized that scientific management had been around for 
decades, but also realized that the evolution of this con-
cept was certain to take place as industry continued to go 
through changes. His view was that scientific manage-
ment was more a set of principles than a system, and 
that it provided a means to view the entire production 
process. Church argued that because scientific manage-
ment focused only on the human element of management 
but did not address issues such as capital and labor, it was 
not a complete system. Vangermeersh traces L. P. Alford's 
work with Church to develop what they viewed to be the 
scientific art of management, which focused on more than 
just one system. In 1912, Alford published an article titled 
The Principles of Management, which presented the foun-
dation for their views. Three basic principles of manage-
ment were presented: 
1. Systematic use of experience. 
2. Economic control of effort. 
3. Promotion of personal effectiveness. 
Each principle was to be measured and analyzed by 
leadership in conjunction with the workgroups. The 
resulting information provided a means to capture the 
performance of the workgroups. 
The early 1900s also brought about a systematic iden-
tification of critical performance variables; with the pub-
lication of a return-on-investment model, Donaldson 
Brown, working for DuPont at the time, formulated 
a model to analyze the various components of return 
on investment. The model provided for a comprehensive 
series of financial indicators. Brown was later moved to 
General Motors, a company experiencing a significant 
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nptum in the market in tcmns of p<'rformancP. CenPml 
Motors (GM) was faced with the prohlem of managin)!; 
pnxluct vaiiation whilt• maintaining production standard-
ization. Ford Motors, on the other hand. lagging behind in 
the market. sacrificed product difforentiation for pro<i11<"-
tion volume. While GM measured performance nsing tlw 
modl'I developed at DuPont. Henry Fore! hacl littlf"' con-
sideration for the evaluation of financial performan<:e of 
Ford Motors. Not only did he not develop measures to 
l'Valuate such performanee. he appeared 1meont·enwd 
about return rates or other financial memmres. llis 
focns W<L~ on nonfinandal measures tied direetlv to tlw 
shop floor. This differem·t• in the approach to m;asnring 
performance continued for years. not only across organi-
zations bnt also within organizations. Essentially. Ford 
was looking at causality from tlw perspective of 
a process-hased model. GM had what can he desc:rilwd 
as a results-based model that w:t<; more remote from the 
ac:tual production proc:ess . ln a l 993 field study of highly 
suc:cessful organizations. Euske and co-workers found 
that a key midmanagement role was translating or finding 
a way to tie the top-level financial me<t'iures to operational 
measures of performance. 
ln the environments in whic:h Brown operated, retnm 
on investment was a useful tool. Return on investment. 
both in nominal and in discounted fonns. W<l'i a 11seli1I 
form of measurement for organizations that expt>rienced 
the kind of growth and prosperity that c;M saw during tlw 
early 1900s. However. ri>h1rn on investment as a measure· 
of performance has a nmnlwr of weak1wsses that are wt•ll 
documented in the literature. 
Middle to Late 20th Century 
By the mid-1940s. everyone from engineers to social sci-
entists was shtdying rnrious <t'>pects of control. ineluding 
performanc:e measnrPment. Norbert Wiener. a matlwma-
tician. coi1wd the term "'l'diemetics .. as a theorv ofrontrol 
svstems based on com1~1m1ic:ation. It was tl~e work of 
a numher of individuals. including \V. Ross Ashh~· 
and C. \\.est Churc:hman. that expanded the idea to l'o111-
plex systems. Tlwir work USPS tlw clt•cision as the unit or 
analysis. The decision variable then lwcomes an impor-
tant elenwnt in the system dt•sign for performanc<' control 
(SDPC) modt•I. 
The SDPC model. using c:ybemetics and systems 
theory <l~ its basis. can lw clesc:rihed as a model for ~tiding 
tlw actions of organizational planners using tlw following 
St'\'t'n ph<L"('S: 
l. Identifying the goal: Defining the rnriables and 
parameters. 
2. Formulating tht> strateg)·: Composing th1· con-
trolled and uncontrolled variables . 
1 Orgnni'.7.ing thr stn10tnrP'. Dfiromprn:inu thP rlPpPn-
dcnt and independent c:ontrolled variables. 
..i . Training the dedsion makns: Amplifying rq~ul­
atory capacity over the dependent and independt•11t 
controlled variables. 
.5. Coordinating the firm: Recomposing the depen-
dent and indrpendrnt c:ontrolkd variahles. 
fi . Monitoring the envinmnwnt: Sv11d1ronizing thr 
eontrolled and um:ontrolled variables. 
"i. Valuing the pprformane(•: Evaluating tlH ... variablt·s 
and parnmt'ters. 
For the SDPC proc:t•ss to be ellt•c:tiw. it must be part of an 
ongoing planning eyde. l'ontinuously applied to the orga-
niz.ation. Of particular interest is the la~tphaseofthe SDPC 
pro('ess. whic:h addresses the need to evaluate the past 
performance of the system and the value of that informa-
tion as it applies to li1ture applications. This phase requires 
reliable data from various sonrct,s . Given a svstems tht•on· 
basis for tlw SDPC proc:ess. the data gathe~ed. once am~­
lyzed. can be used as part of an overall evaluation of tlw 
t>ntity. First. the data can he used to ensure that the desig11 
and decision processes are working properly. Sec:ond. the 
data prO\·ide infonnation to stockholders for determining 
the appropriatt' resources to allocatt> to SJx>ci fie processes 
or systems. Finally. the data can be used to communicate 
results to the nonstockholders regarding the performanc:t• 
of tlw organization. Although clesig1wcl within a systi•ms 
theory framework. SDPC relies lwmil~-. hnt not t•xd11-
sively. on accounting data. 
The use of finanl'ial data was impmtant dnring this pt•-
riod not onlv in modt>ls suc:h as SDPC. bnt also in the 
retnrn-011-in~·pstment model. 01w variation of the re-
turn-on-investment model that had l)('en used for decades 
was residual income. Although the use of the measure had 
waned during the latter pmt of tlw 20th C'entnry. during the 
l 990s. the use ofresidual income experienced a resu rgenet• 
in the form of eeonomic: value added (EVA). promoti, d by 
Stern Stewart & Co. in puhlieations suelt <L~ C . Bemwtt 
Sti•wart "s The Q11est for Value. 
Heturn on investment and SDPC proved very usefiil 
through tlw mid- 1900s. llmwwr. problems lwgan to 
ariSt' \'\-ith tht• llSI' or shmter-ft•rm finanl'ia) nl!'asun•-
nWlltS. Managns realizl'cl that during clifficult tinws. 
wlwn salt's wc•n• 011 tlw d!'di1w and margins w1•n· 1101 
as ac:l'eptahle as they had ht·1·n. profit and rl'lnrn on i11-
vpstment targets could still he nwt by working a little 
harder in the finance office. For example. the discretion 
that existi·cl for the timing of revenw· and expens<> n·cog-
nition for tlw current accounting peri<KI could aflt.'d tlw 
outcomes measured hv the accounting svstern. 
A different appn;ach addressed, tiw problt•m of 
the short-ti>rm focus and the ability to manipulatl:' finan-
cial 11wasun·s. In this approach. tlw focus on pt>rfonn-
anc:t· nwasnn•s shifh·d toward nonfinancial nwasures. 
Measures that focused on an organization's strategy 
and evaluated areas such as research, development, and 
manufacturing became increasingly important in the 
1980s and 1990s. As an example, a company might choose 
to measure productivity information in order to become 
more efficient in the manufacturing process, thereby 
becoming more competitive in the marketplace. Other 
approaches recognized the need for flexibility in both 
design and manufacturing and the need to develop ways 
to measure product design implications as part of the 
overall research and development process. 
The introduction of both financial and nonfinancial 
measures had the potential to impose on an organization 
the overwhelming task of trying to manage too many dif-
ferent measurements. Nevertheless, the approach offered 
the opportunity to capture multiple aspects of perfor-
mance. However, at any one point in time, it is likely 
that only a few of the measures would be significant to 
an organization. The need for a mix or balance of mea-
sures was not a new idea. The Tableau de Bord used by the 
French at least since the early 1900s is just such a mix of 
measures. 
The 1990s saw a continuation of the discussion of the 
relevance of both financial and nonfinancial measure-
ments, but with an emphasis on the employee's role in 
improving the organization, based on data gathered in the 
measurement process. In Relevance Regained ( 1992), 
Johnson, focusing on the global marketplace, argued 
that if an organization is to be successful, it is essential 
to capitalize on the potential of the employees and to 
eliminate any performance measures or other manage-
ment information that do not support behavior congruent 
with the imperatives of global competitiveness. Johnson 
stated that the imperatives for a globally competitive or-
ganization create an environment that allows employees 
to use their skills and talents to the fullest. The globally 
competitive organization creates an environment such 
that employees can then begin to understand how the 
entire organization impacts the way that customers 
view performance, and to understand their individual 
responsibilities to meet those customer needs. 
The different models that appeared during the 1990s 
incorporated both financial and nonfinancial measures. 
For example, in 1991, Lynch and Cross introduced the 
performance pyramid. The pyramid contained four levels 
of objectives and measures to link strategy and operations 
by translating strategic objectives from the top down and 
measures from the bottom up. The top level of the pyra-
mid is the vision for the organization as stated by the 
senior management of the company. The second level 
contains objectives for each business unit in terms of 
markets and financial data. The third level represents 
the core processes supporting the organizational strategy, 
with tangible objectives and priorities as they relate to 
areas such as customer satisfaction and productivity. 
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Finally, the base of the pyramid represents the conversion 
of the objectives into specific criteria, such as quality and 
cycle time for each department or organizational compo-
nent. The Lynch and Cross model enables the members of 
the organization to communicate to employees those 
measures that are important and also provides for an un-
derstanding of how those measures relate to the objectives 
of the organization. 
In 1992, Kaplan and Norton popularized a tool devel-
oped at Advanced Micro Devices (AMD). The tool was 
designed to provide managers with the information they 
deem necessary to be successful in today's business en-
vironment. Kaplan and Norton, on the opening pages of 
their book, The Balanced Scorecard, argued that "the 
Balanced Scorecard translates an organization's mission 
and strategy into a comprehensive set of performance 
measures that provides the framework for a strategic mea-
surement and management system. The scorecard mea-
sures organizational performance across four balanced 
perspectives: financial, customers, internal business 
processes, and learning and growth." The approach to 
develop a performance pyramid and balanced scorecard 
are slightly different. Although both models provide for 
input from employees at all levels of the organization, the 
balanced scorecard has more of a top-down approach, 
compared to the pyramid. 
As business and technology continue to shift, the need 
for information to understand the performance of orga-
nizations will continue to change. The evolution of per-
formance measurement is a continuing effort to model 
performance in a fashion that helps the stakeholders un-
derstand the organization. 
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